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I’m sending this one out to everybody that’s had to wait on a money 
transfer…
You know how good it feels when they say:
You can pick it up today, it’s fifteen minutes away…
Feels like an angel’s beacon, I can hardly believe it…
I got my biz in order, I made it cross the border
‘Such dazzle such a horror, his life is like an opera’
I haven’t gone astray, don’t drink or smoke or sway
Though sometimes I don’t pray, it feels so good to say
Go out and receive it, cause I just know you need it
Your boy has grown up decent, Grandma can you believe it
You can pick it up today, it’s fifteen minutes away…
I just want to give a quick shout out to all those people who’ve helped 
me along the way…
Now I’m sending money to people. 
Generosity is the key…
K’Naan, “15 Minutes Away”
Sometimes I shout at them…‘Do you think we are collecting the money 
from the trees?’…But they won’t understand. I told myself, when I left 
Somalia, when I looked down from the plane, I said ‘I never ever want 
to come back here!’ After one week I wanted to go back!…They have 
no minimum clue the position you’re in, how much pressure you’re 
under…They wake up in the morning and they don’t know where to get 
breakfast. That is the life they are dealing with…If they are lucky they 
got your phone number, so they call you hoping you can help.
Interview with Shamsa in London, May 20051
These views neatly capture the ambiguous feelings that soon become 
apparent when asking Somali Londoners about sending money 
“home.” A relative minority of the Somali regions’ so-called “missing 
million” have settled in the Global North, but they provide the bulk 
of remittance funds. A key node in global trade and finance, London 
has also witnessed “globalisation from below”: by the beginning of the 
21st century over one third of the workforce was born abroad.2 While 
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the dynamics and impact of immigration and asylum in London are 
relatively well-recorded and well-researched, the fact that London is 
also a key source of remittances for poorer countries has only come 
to the attention of researchers and policymakers in recent years. The 
World Bank in 2008 suggested that migrants in the U.K. sent official 
remittances amounting to some $4.5 billion in 2006.
The “new economics of labour migration” represents the only sys-
tematic and detailed attempt to theorise remittance behaviour. It con-
tends that migration is a household-level response to constraints in 
local credit, insurance, or other markets.3 Deciding whether a house-
hold member should migrate involved weighing the costs of migra-
tion (such as foregone family agricultural labour and travel expenses) 
against the anticipated benefits (such as remittances). In this way, remit-
tances became central to migration decisions, reflecting an implicit 
contract between the migrant and those left behind—underwritten by 
altruism, self-interest, mutual insurance motives, or loan repayment 
obligations. This model fits the realities of voluntary, temporary, most 
likely male migration from cohesive households in rural Mexican com-
munities, which have provided much of the empirical material for 
theory-making particularly well, but seems to have less purchase in 
other contexts.4
This article examines why Somali Londoners send money and the 
effects that this has on their lives. Although quantitative testing of 
classic hypotheses relating to remittance behaviour has not been pos-
sible based on the data available, analysis of the Somali remittance 
process raises several issues that would be worth exploring in future 
studies. In particular it explores the implications of the violent origins 
of migration for the remittance process and the social texture of these 
transfers. By investigating the migration and remittance experiences 
of people of Somali origin in London, it also addresses an important 
gap, because remittance literature has been primarily concerned with 
understanding the economic effects of labour migration and remitting 
on recipient households, regions, and countries, while neglecting the 
disaporic perspective.
This article draws on informal consultations, some thirty interviews, 
and a survey of 175 remitters in a London money-transfer office belong-
ing to Dahabshiil Company.5 Although not a statistically representative 
sample of remitters in London, the information that respondents pro-
vided gives a broadly indicative picture of remittance patterns. While 
every host context is different, many of the findings from London are 
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echoed in evidence from elsewhere in the Somali diaspora, and indeed 
among other refugee groups, as we will see. This article first explores 
the particular history of Somali migration to the U.K., then considers 
the widespread engagement of Somali Londoners in the remittance 
process, exploring who is sending money, the social micro-dynamics 
underlying remittance relationships, and the repercussions of remit-
ting in their lives.
I. Seeking Asylum and Settling in a Global City
While the first Somali seamen working in the U.K. for the Merchant 
Navy were viewed by their communities as intrepid adventurers—
tacaabir—since the late 1980s people have come to the U.K. on an adven-
ture not of their own choosing, as refugees. Some came directly; others 
after a period in refugee camps and cities in neighbouring countries or 
the Middle East; some ended up in the U.K. as a result of a smuggling 
process in which they exercised little control. Many made circuitous 
journeys in search of safety and rights. As the U.K. tightened its policy 
toward asylum-seekers, it became difficult to claim asylum without 
false documents, and social networks became particularly crucial in 
providing information, money, and assistance on arrival. The experi-
ences of the refugees interviewed provide a contrast with some of the 
more upbeat literature on processes of globalisation and migration:
[D]ifferent social groups and different individuals are placed in very 
distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections… .  some 
people are more in charge of it than others: some initiate flows and 
movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than 
others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.6
Many Somali people coming to the U.K. were recognised as refu-
gees and subsequently became citizens while others gained some form 
of subsidiary protection. An unknown number are failed asylum-seek-
ers, are homeless and/or rely on support from NGOs, local councils, or 
relatives. Some close family members of people permanently settled in 
the U.K. were able to apply for family reunion. Finally, there is some 
relocation of Somali EU citizens from other EU countries to the U.K., 
particularly from the Netherlands and Scandinavia.7
It is hard to know the exact numbers but it seems likely that there 
are well over 71,000 people who were born in Somalia8 and now live in 
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the U.K. The ethnic population, including European-born children and 
Ethiopian and Kenyan Somalis, must be much larger. The process of 
migration dramatically reconfigured conventional pre-war economic 
roles in many diasporic households, with women often taking a more 
prominent role in decision-making and income-generation in London. 
The emotional and economic strains of displacement and settlement 
have often led to marital breakdown, and there are widespread con-
cerns about excessive qaat usage among men. A plethora of Somali 
community support organisations have been established, many surviv-
ing on only meagre funds and the energy and dedication of volunteers, 
but they come under heavy criticism for their often clan-based nature. 
This demonstrates the gulf between the ways that the host state’s mul-
ticultural model, requiring devolution of responsibility to cohesive eth-
nic communities in ways shaped by the experience of Empire, and the 
complex, tense, transnational social worlds in which Somalis arriving 
in the U.K. often find themselves.9
Economic indicators have been poor. According to the 2001 Census, 
only around 16% of Somali-born people in London of working age 
were officially employed—the lowest rate of all foreign-born groups.10 
Somali-born people were employed in diverse industries: particularly 
wholesale and retail trade; real estate, rental, and business activities; 
and health and social work. There are no major labour market niches 
as with some immigrant groups, although anecdotally, there are a 
handful of very specific niches where Somalis work in larger num-
bers: community workers, taxi drivers, bus drivers, cleaners at Victo-
ria station, and workers at Heathrow Airport. Labour market barriers 
include language skills, immigration status, racism and discrimination, 
poor literacy, and problems with converting professional qualifications 
gained elsewhere.11 At the same time, some people have established 
successful businesses, particularly money transfer agencies, Internet 
and telecommunications bureaus, taxi firms, and restaurants and cafes 
serving Somali food, following the classic immigrant pathways into 
self-employment. Many Somali Europeans relocating to the U.K. cite 
the more promising business environment as a major pull factor, and 
there are suggestions that over time the economic integration of people 
of Somali origin, while still a matter of concern, may be improving.
London is the hub of a wide range of transnational activities. It 
has been a destination for exiled politicians from all over the Somali 
regions and a source of political and military fundraising. Many com-
munity associations are also involved in fundraising for schools and 
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other community projects in the Somali regions. There is a constant 
exchange of information between London and the Horn of Africa 
through phone calls, email, chat rooms, Somali language newspapers, 
online news, and visits by prominent people. Some people spend parts 
of the year in the more stable northern Somali regions, as “revolving 
returnees,” effectively forming a “part-time disapora.”12 Summer vis-
its allow people to spend time with their families, show the children 
“their culture,” and in some cases oversee house building or investi-
gate business opportunities. Amid these various types of transnational 
exchange, there is the constant rhythm of remittances leaving London 
for the Horn of Africa.
II. Who Pays the Bill?
It is not known exactly what proportion of Somali people in the U.K. 
send remittances. Many people expansively claim that, “Everyone 
sends money.” But of course, some people do not. The desire to engage 
in transnational activities is influenced by various factors and is not 
always matched by the capability to do so; conversely, some people 
who are capable of sending money do not wish to.13 However, most 
people whom I asked during the course of the research said they had 
remitted some money in the previous year, even if only an ad hoc, 
small amount.
The remitter survey results regarding amounts transferred dur-
ing the last twelve months are shown in Table 1. The first and most 
important type were remittances to personal contacts in Somalia or 
elsewhere, which averaged around $3,110 per year ($260 a month).14 
Many people also made transfers for investment or community-related 
activities in Somalia, bringing total average transfers to around $4,440 
per year, although amounts tended to cluster in the lower ranges.15 
Remittance patterns varied: in this sample, 61% remitted to at least one 
individual on a monthly basis, although many remitted less frequently 
and some only on an ad-hoc basis for specific projects or urgent needs.
Figure 1 shows the gender and age distribution of respondents. 
Around three fifths were men, two fifths were women, and most remit-
ters of both sexes were aged 25–44.16 The average household size was 
3.4: around a quarter lived alone (mainly men); two fifths lived with 
children under 16; and around one third lived with a spouse. The 
vast majority of the remitters surveyed were born in Somalia, most 
left since the conflict began, and nearly all had citizenship or refugee 
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or temporary status. Economic activities varied. Figure 2 shows that 
56% of working age respondents were working, 12% were looking for 
work, and 14% were occupied looking after their home and family. 
People were employed in health, social services and the voluntary sec-
tor, public and private transport, warehouse/factory labor, and secu-
rity. Only a handful was self-employed. The sample fell into four crude 
household income groups. Around 30% worked and one or more other 
household member(s) also worked. Around 20% worked but were the 
only household member doing so. Around 30% were not working but 
someone else in their household did. The remaining 20% or so lived in 
households with no apparent source of earned income, probably rely-
ing on state benefits.
To calculate the determinants of the likelihood and level of remit-
ting, it would be necessary to take a random sample from the migrant 
population and analyse the characteristics of those who remit and 
those who do not. However, some useful insights were gained from 
comparing the remitter sample with Census data.17 In demographic 
terms, for example, Figure 1 showed that remitters were more likely to 
be aged 25–44 than was the general Somali-born population. It is some-
times said that women are “better” remitters than men. In our sample, 
however, there was a greater proportion of men than in the general 
Somali-born population and male respondents sent larger remittances 
on average ($3,645), although women still sent considerable sums 
($2,340). It would seem that there has been a significant relative rather 
than an absolute change. Men dominate as senders, but women play a 
Table 1. Remittances and Other Transfers
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Number of cases (US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) Before
Remittances to 
 persona contacts 171 50 22,550 3,108 2,250
Investment transfers
 (Somali regions)  21 19 50,000   990     0
Community contributions
 (Somali regions) 113 10  8,756   341    74
Total 175 50 52,400 4,438 2,493
Source: Remitter Survey June 2005.
Notes: Data for the twelve months leading up to the survey. Due to time constraints
 respondents were not asked about investments or community contributions 
 outside Somalia. Averages calculated over whole sample.
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considerable minority role, widely noted because it runs counter to the 
traditional culture.
Turning to economic characteristics, the evidence suggests that, 
unsurprisingly, the economic situation affects remittances. Figure 2 
shows that the remitters surveyed had higher (by over three times) 
employment rates than the general Somali-born population. More-
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Figure 1. Remitters and Somali-Born Population by Gender and Age
Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 and Census 2001 England and Wales.
Figure 2. Remitters and Somali-Born Population by Economic Profile
Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 and Census 2001 England and Wales.
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over, workers sent approximately three times larger amounts than 
non-workers. Remitters in multiple income households sent the most, 
followed by those in single income households in which the remitter 
worked.
III. The Social Micro-Dynamics of Remittances
Conventional micro-economic approaches to studying remittances 
can be dismissive of people’s own (subjective) explanations for their 
actions, focusing rather on measuring their behaviour and extrapolat-
ing explanations. However, insights from economic anthropology and 
sociology point to how economic actions are intricately embedded 
in social relations. They suggest that, particularly in more traditional 
societies:
[A] material transaction is usually a momentary episode in a continuous 
social relation. The social relation exerts governance: the flow of goods is 
constrained by, is part of, a status etiquette…Yet the connection between 
material flow and social relations is reciprocal…If friends make gifts, 
gifts make friends…the material flow underwrites social relations.18
It follows that to explain remitting, we have to not only explore 
how people act, but also the meanings that they attach to these actions. 
Remittance practices vary and may carry rather different meanings in 
different cultural settings. For example, Cliggett outlines how Zambian 
rural-urban migrants make social investments through intermittent 
gifts in-kind in the expectation of being welcomed on their return.19 
Bajic describes the proud resistance among middle-class urban Ser-
bian parents, despite their worsening economic situation, to receiving 
remittances from their migrant children.20
What are the social micro-dynamics of remitting in the Somali case? 
Farhiya’s experience is illustrative. As a working woman who came to 
the U.K. many years ago, with three children, Farhiya has continued to 
support her family over a long period of time. Her husband also works 
and both have siblings in Somalia whom they separately support. Sort-
ing through the receipts, which she had begun to retain and store in a 
box couple of years earlier, showed the complexity of remittance pat-
terns. In total she sent more than $5,000 in the previous year, which 
was not an unusual amount for Somali Londoner to remit. First, she 
was supporting the family of her oldest brother in Somalia. He is an 
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elder and was once well off, but his business collapsed during the war. 
She felt that she owed him because he played a key role in her upbring-
ing. After arriving in the U.K., she sent money now and again, but then 
he asked her for more regular support, initially on a temporary basis. 
This somehow became a permanent arrangement and, for some years, 
Farhiya sent $100 each month to her sister-in-law for general house-
hold needs. Her brother sometimes asked—directly or indirectly—for 
extra help. One day he asked her to send the money for one year in 
advance so they could start a small business. She agreed, on the basis 
that once the business was set up, they would support themselves. 
With difficulty, for two years Farhiya sent larger instalments, but, as 
no successful business emerged and with no clear explanation for why 
not, she told them she would go back to sending $100 each month.
Second, a few years ago, Farhiya decided to send her half-brother to 
Nairobi. He was a bright young man with a reputation of being hard 
working. Farhiya wanted him to study “something useful”—perhaps 
computers, Swahili, or English—and was considering trying to bring 
him to the U.K. She sent money for his expenses, but then found out 
that he was spending his time chewing qaat. She threatened to stop 
if he did not pull his act together, and said each month she would 
send $50 to him for rent and $50 to their cousin to cook his meals. He 
was angry that she had asked around about him, and went to live in 
a remote refugee camp where she did not know anyone. When we 
spoke, she told me that he sometimes phones and she still is some-
times persuaded to send him some money, but she does not send on a 
monthly basis anymore.
Lastly, she sometimes helped another brother in town and her 
nomadic sisters. Yet another sister lives in London but has been back 
a few times, trying to arrange visas for her children. When she goes 
back, occasionally she asks for help or relays others’ requests. Farhiya 
also sometimes remits money to extended family members and con-
tributes to qadhaan (clan-based collections) for individuals and social 
projects in their hometown.
Many remitters interviewed, like Farhiya, expressed feelings of 
indebtedness to their parents, and often older brothers or uncles, for 
earlier material and non-material assistance, particularly for bringing 
them up, helping with their education, and sometimes for paying for 
them to go overseas. The most common beneficiaries of the Somali 
Londoners surveyed were siblings and parents (71%).21 Spouses were 
less common recipients (9% of regular recipients, as many Somali cou-
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ples were split by death, separation, or divorce, and many others were 
reunited or were married overseas) although predictably had a strong 
claim for assistance, receiving the highest average amount. People also 
sent money to other family members and friends, who accounted for 
17% of the regular recipients and 12% of the volume.
However, in most cases where people expressed a sense of debt, it 
was rather diffuse and indefinite, resonating with the anthropologi-
cal concept of generalised reciprocity typical among kin, involving no 
overt reckoning of debts, where returns may be much delayed and not 
necessarily equivalent in form or measure to what has been given (as 
distinct from balanced reciprocity, in which returns of commensurate 
worth are anticipated).22 For example, Liban, a community worker, 
rationalised his own situation of supporting four uncles regularly and 
twelve aunts intermittently by saying, “You eat with your brother 
when he has money.”23 Also, debts were often transferable within fam-
ily networks. If a man was assisted by an older uncle to migrate to 
the U.K., for instance, he might return the favour by paying a cousin’s 
school fees.
People explained that sending money was a way to maintain affec-
tionate relationships in the absence of other regular forms of face-
to-face interaction, which usually reinforces family relations. This 
resonates with evidence from Zambia, where sending gifts has been 
described as a way to “remember” or “recognise” people, and from 
El Salvador where people are said to “measure affection” in remit-
tances.24 For many Somalis in the U.K., sending remittances became 
a critical factor in maintaining a sense of familial harmony and well 
being. Such non-material returns for remitting can play a key—and 
as yet under-theorised—role in motivating remittances, a role which 
is hard to capture using survey methods. In some cases, in the back of 
their minds people were also preserving the possibility of eventually 
returning in dignity to the Somali region. In the shorter term, some 
anticipated that if they did wish to visit their home area, they could 
count on their family providing hospitality and security.
The global infrastructure of telecommunications, travel, and money 
transfer plays a key role in mediating the remittance process. As one 
money transfer agent pointed out, “If you have a call every morn-
ing from a family member, then you are going to send money.”25 It 
is relatively easy to send money from the U.K. to the Somali regions 
because the U.K. has had one of the more liberal regimes for regulating 
money transmission. The fact that fees on small amounts are reason-
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ably affordable means that people are sending money on a monthly 
basis, and in some cases more frequently. These infrastructures are 
well developed and relatively competitive in the Somali regions (in 
sharp contrast to some other conflict-affected settings). It brings the 
lives of those overseas closer to those “back home,” and makes the 
whole remittance system more responsive to events.
In this context, considerable social pressure can be applied. Many 
Somalis would be shamed if they did not support their relatives: 
one survey respondent said he would be “struck off the family list.” 
Farhiya, like many others, said that if she stopped sending money 
to her brother, it would not only sour her relationship with him, but 
people in their hometown would also notice and say that she forgot 
her family. People in the community in the U.K. might also give her 
a hard time. Given the importance of diaspora networks for many 
refugees—for social contact, financial assistance, information, and help 
navigating life in the U.K.—adverse gossip can have genuine repercus-
sions on people’s lives.
Material need and economic disparities were another recurrent 
theme in people’s explanations. Interviewees emphasised the poverty 
and insecurity of many Somalis in Africa. Farhiya talked of the “mis-
ery” in her home community: some of the extended family sometimes 
ate only once a day. Either directly or through other people, many 
Somalis in the U.K. are constantly hearing sad stories of their rela-
tives’ desperate or dangerous situations. Abdirashid, from Mogadishu, 
spoke of his sense of responsibility:
If we don’t send money to Somalia, people they don’t survive…the chil-
dren, if they don’t go to school, they become militia, simple!…If someone 
called me today and says my child cannot go to school because I don’t 
have money for the school fees, I should feel guilty, if I have got money 
and someone told me that. Someone to die, or maybe 10p [for school 
fees], yeah?26
It is not just about absolute need, it is also about the disparity 
between the relative positions of sender and recipient. This fits with 
the theory that within relationships characterised by generalised reci-
procity,
The greater the wealth gap…the greater the demonstrable assistance 
from rich to poor that is necessary just to maintain a degree of sociabil-
ity…the inclination toward generalized exchange deepens where the 
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economic gap amounts to oversupply and undersupply of customary 
requirements and, especially, of urgent stuff.27
A “global city” in the heart of the First World, London provides 
a clear contrast with the country of origin. People commented that 
relatives in Africa think that dadka dibadaha (“people outside”) are 
rich, seeing incoming remittances (often substantial amounts by local 
standards) as proof. There are concrete facts: Table 2 reveals some of 
the starkest disparities in a world of uneven development. Clearly, 
relatively small amounts by U.K. standards can go a long way in the 
Somali regions. Between $50 and $200 a month, for example, can pro-
vide for an entire family, depending on size and location. Many people 
in the Global North are able to send monthly amounts that can meet all 
the needs of a family in the Somali regions. Sometimes they can afford 
to make substantial investments. Even people who are quite poor may 
be able to play an important role in relatives’ livelihoods, and it can 
be hard to justify withdrawing that support. In this context, one-way 
flows may continue for long periods.
However, there is evidence of some mutual re-evaluation. On one 
hand, recipients are aware of some of the problems people face over-
seas, and some people try to impress these on them during visits and 
phone calls. On the other hand, as some progress is made in Somalil-
and and elsewhere, some people are beginning to deconstruct the sym-
bolic poverty and insecurity of their place of origin, pointing to the 
relative affluence in the better-off segments of society. As one Hargeisa 
resident put it, some people overseas who visit or see videos re-evalu-
ate their “congested life,” penny-pinching in the tower blocks of the 
cold Global North, with mounting electricity and phone bills. As we 
shall see, even those who have both the desire and capability to remit 
often find that doing so has important repercussions on life in the U.K. 
Some people return to Somaliland or even relocate to Egypt, seeking a 
more middle-class life.28
Table 2. Comparison of Human Development Indicators
 UK Somalia
Life expectancy at birth 79 years 46 years
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 6 225
Adult literacy rate 99% 19%*
Primary school enrolment rate 99% 17%*
Population on less than $1 per day (purchasing power parity)  0% 43%*
Source: UNDP (2006), except figures marked* from UNDP and World Bank (2003).
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IV. Economic Sacrifices and Strategies, 
Social Reaffirmation and Tensions
Despite anecdotal evidence of migrants working long hours in several 
jobs in order to send money, the effects of remitting on senders are 
largely unresearched. The sparse qualitative studies that shed light 
on the experiences of refugees sending remittances tend to empha-
sise the elements of political coercion and the burden that sending 
money imposes on lives in the Global North.29 Interviews with people 
of Somali origin in London suggest that remitting has several types of 
effect on senders.
In economic terms, poverty may be reinforced by remitting. Without 
data on remitters’ incomes,30 it is not possible to establish the propor-
tion remitted. However, it is clear that many remitters are employed 
in relatively low-paid jobs and are unlikely to have large amounts of 
disposable income. According to Idil, some remitters “don’t live lives 
because of it basically…Most of them, people who were working in 
factories, doing manual hard work, long shifts, sending money, get-
ting the lowest incomes. Their basic wage is not much and they send 
to relatives.”31 As one woman put it, “When you get income support, 
you can save fifty dollars per month.”32 People on low incomes often 
economise drastically, buying cheap food and pooling resources with 
people outside their household. When this is not enough, they borrow 
money from banks and social contacts, and women pawn their gold. 
Idil explained: “I have taken my jewellery to the pawnbrokers, and lost 
it all…I don’t regret it, it’s only things…I don’t pay bills until I get the 
red letters because I am always sending money!”33
Even some people relying on state support—for example, elderly 
seamen relying on state pensions—send small amounts now and again. 
The survey was undertaken in an inner-city area with relatively high 
unemployment. Around 20% of remitters surveyed lived in house-
holds where there were no apparent sources of earned income, pre-
sumably relying on state allowances. The finding is surprising because 
state allowances provide just enough money to live on in London.34 
It is a small subgroup (35 people) in a small sample, and it is possible 
that some respondents in fact did have other sources of income that 
they did not want to mention. But remitting part of state allowances 
raises interesting issues. This money is the means by which the state 
ensures a minimal standard of living for its poor and their dependents. 
Yet some people may quietly accept material poverty below this stan-
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dard in order to send small sums to loved ones in need overseas. As 
Bryceson and Vuorela point out, for transnational families, “Imagining 
a family means giving it a definition that may conflict with the nation 
state’s definition of legitimate immigrant families.”35
The fact that many migrants remit from meagre incomes is by no 
means unique to Somalis.36 Indeed, some have suggested that one rea-
son that remittances remain relatively stable, even during economic 
downturns in developed host states, is because of social protection sys-
tems.37 However, the implications are serious for those involved. Scrap-
ing together these funds by careful economising of minimal wages or 
allowances pushes them further into poverty. There are also implica-
tions for the role remittances play in the country of origin: entrenched 
poverty in the diaspora can prevent remitting or trap people in a cycle 
of sending subsistence amounts, constraining remittance investments.
Related to the above, labour market, savings, and investment strate-
gies may be affected by commitments to relatives, which make people 
more willing to accept poorly paid manual work in unpleasant condi-
tions, with long shifts at anti-social hours, and motivate people to find 
work as soon as possible, when they might otherwise spend time train-
ing or seeking jobs more appropriate to their skills. The more strategic 
development of remitters’ human capital through English language 
and vocational training as well as secondary and higher education 
might be curtailed. Many refugees arrived with few assets and have 
not accumulated much financial capital. According to the 2001 Census, 
only 7% of the Somali-born population owned their home and only 1% 
were self-employed. These are low rates even compared with people 
from other conflict-affected and African countries.38 Some remit most 
of their earnings, or save it to help relatives emigrate, leaving little to 
save or invest on their own behalf. The problems experienced by some 
of the Somali remitters interviewed remind us that while social net-
works can be an important element in economic life and substantially 
facilitate migration, they may also, in some instances, hinder migrants’ 
economic advancement by constraining accumulation.39 Meanwhile, 
many people who do build up capital invest it in the Somali regions: 
10% of survey respondents had invested in property there in the last 
year. House prices vary and land disputes are common, but money 
goes much further there than in London. There is both a practical and 
a symbolic value of investing at home: a potential future return while 
relatives may occupy the property or live off the rent.
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In social terms, as already indicated, remitting can be an important 
source of familial and cultural reaffirmation. At individual and fam-
ily levels, being able to support relatives can contribute to a sense of 
well-being and make a painful separation seem more worthwhile. In 
the wider cultural sense, interviewees expressed pride that Somalis 
support their families, contrasting this solidarity with what they say 
is a more fragmented and selfish culture in the U.K. and other coun-
tries they were familiar with. However, there are also social tensions 
between senders and recipients. Some expressed an unease that money 
always seems to creep in as an issue in relationships with people back 
home. Some felt that recipients did not appreciate their hard work and 
wasted the money. Shamsa’s brother remits regularly to their father 
in Mogadishu, and Shamsa helps out now and again. She was rather 
annoyed that this enabled her father to marry a younger wife and start 
a new family: “My father is having plenty of children and he’s not even 
taking a consideration…The more you make children, the more you 
are rich. And the more he is rich, the more we are paying the price!” 
Recipients are sometimes less than honest. According to Idil:
I have an aunt who had had all the diseases in the whole wide world! 
She’s had diabetes, diarrhoea, blood pressure, cancer, heart and kidney 
problems. I wouldn’t mind if she just said I don’t have anything to give 
to my kids, she only has to say! [Once she phoned saying she had sight 
problems]… I rang my mum in the US to say can you help her…My 
mum said the woman has called me, she is building a house and she 
needs the doors and the window!…People say anything to get money.40
A second downside is anxiety and stress.41 Given the ongoing inse-
curity in the Somali regions, many refugees are already worried for 
their loved ones’ welfare and safety. On top of that, some spend sleep-
less nights worrying about how to scrape together their family’s biil, 
or living expenses. Idil felt that some people were not “living here as 
a person” but get “blocked out” about remitting. Refusing insistent or 
desperate requests can be painful, as Shamsa, a single mother with 
four children, explained:
How many people you used to know, relatives, calling you!…I would 
change my phone number every month if I could. But you can’t go to all 
those people, the children’s school, your college, the doctor, the Home 
Office…It’s not that I don’t want to help. But I can’t!…It is painful to 
me…‘I need money, I’m hungry, even the phone call, I don’t know how 
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I am going to pay for it, at least send me the money for the phone call.’ 
It irritates me!…I can’t ignore it, I can’t ignore it, I can’t ignore it…it’s like 
you are facing a big wave.42
Third, remitting can be a source of tension among family members 
in the U.K. Life in the U.K. is a jolt for many couples. Some urban 
women accustomed to having help in the home feel the strain when 
they suddenly have to cope with looking after the children and run-
ning the household, alongside dealing with other matters, in an unfa-
miliar, sometimes hostile environment. For some men, immigration 
is an emasculating experience as they struggle to find work and re-
establish their traditional role as breadwinner. With marital relations 
already undergoing complex adjustments, remittances can impose an 
added strain. When the wife works she is usually expected to support 
her relatives back home herself, but if she is a housewife, she often 
wants her husband to help his in-laws as well as his own relatives, 
which can cause marital strife. Brothers and sisters overseas sometimes 
jostle over shared responsibilities. Intergenerational tensions some-
times arise. Forty percent of remitters lived in households with chil-
dren under 16, many of whom grew up a long way from their relatives 
and sometimes struggle to understand why their parents send money. 
In transnational communities, children “have to construct their notion 
of a family and its emotional and economic utility more deliberately, 
rather than taking it for granted through continuous day-to-day inter-
action. A family in the absence of regular physical proximity requires 
conscious rationalization.”43 While Somali diaspora culture has shown 
resistance to erosion from what are seen as Western and individualis-
tic values, there is some “nuclearisation” of families as they bring up 
their children in London and elsewhere. Others make special efforts to 
bring their children up with a sense of responsibility for relatives in the 
Somali regions.
How do people deal with requests for assistance, which clearly can 
sometimes weigh heavy on them? While many simply persevere, oth-
ers adopt various strategies to cope. First, negotiation within family 
networks can make remittance commitments more manageable. Of 
the respondents, 72% had close family members beyond the Horn of 
Africa: people may take turns or each contribute toward a combined 
monthly amount. At the other end, the main recipient in Somalia may 
channel funds and buffer requests. Another strategy is to keep track of 
how much is sent and to whom. While many people find that difficult, 
Anna Lindley
55
some feel it is worthwhile in case they need to negotiate or deflect 
future requests. This is why Farhiya began collecting her receipts:
They think that I never give them enough…One day if I go there I will 
calculate how much I have sent…I will be sitting in their home…it will 
come up…Maybe they will realise: either it doesn’t work sending all this 
money or…Maybe it will help them to think…I will take the receipts in 
the box! I have sent tens of thousands [of dollars], maybe hundreds of 
thousands.44
There are also ways to keep tabs on the recipients. It can be difficult 
for people to impose conditions on how the money is used, acknowl-
edging their distance from the local situation and fearing a cold 
response. Often members of the diaspora are seen, or see themselves, 
as xabxab (watermelon) hearts, i.e., soft touches. According to a money 
transfer agent in Hargeisa:
The diaspora for example in England, they spoil their families. They 
send money without any checking or consulting…No strings attached! 
You should…tell your people that you are not earning [money] by sitting 
down. You should say, ‘this is the last instalment, you have to do that 
job.’ But they are shy, are ashamed to do that.45
However, many respondents discuss with their family members 
how much money they need, and send just enough to prevent hard-
ship—a kind of “subsistence ethic.” As we have seen in several cases, 
the gossip machine can serve migrants too, relaying information about 
how money is spent and identifying potential “worthy” beneficiaries. 
Some people refuse to send money for particular types of community 
purposes, for example for qadhaan, when they think this will be used to 
buy weapons or for purposes that they consider frivolous or unneces-
sary.
Another strategy to cope with remittance obligations is to help recip-
ients invest in an independent future. Most directly, some save a lump 
sum to help recipients establish a small business. (Women sometimes 
use hagbaad, the rotating savings system, to do this.) Yet this is not 
always feasible, for example, if you cannot save enough or if relatives 
are too old or young or live in a particularly insecure area. Alterna-
tively, remitters often sponsor the education of young relatives or help 
relatives move to neighbouring countries or further afield. From the 
remitters’ point of view this can turn a dependent into someone who 
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may be able to help with, or even take over, their remittance respon-
sibilities, lending an internal momentum to the migration-remittance 
process.
Finally, some people simply avoid remitting. Consistent refusals 
often eventually deter callers. Some evade contact by ignoring early 
morning phone calls, avoiding giving their phone number to people 
back home, and even changing phone numbers. Pleading one’s own 
poverty often fails to convince, but consistent excuses can be effective 
in the long term.
In light of these complex repercussions, and the strategies that refu-
gees have developed to deal with requests, the sustainability of the 
remittance economy is much debated among the Somali people and 
foreign commentators. Sustaining or increasing remittance volume is a 
common policy goal of countries with high emigration, and the United 
Nations’ Transitional Plan for Somalia in 2007 aimed to increase remit-
tances by 10% in a two-year period as part of the pursuit of the Millen-
nium Development Goals.46 Given the nature of the remittance process 
as described from a diaspora perspective, were such goals desirable or 
realistic? It is generally assumed that if migrants do not return home, 
remitting will decline over time as they face competing claims on their 
income from their growing family in the host country, and social ties 
with family back home gradually weaken.47 Yet this hypothesis has 
rarely been tested and conflicts with evidence on the growth of “trans-
national communities.”48 The absence of reliable macro-level and lon-
gitudinal data inhibits analysis of the Somali case, but we can identify 
several factors that seem likely to shape remittance patterns over the 
coming years.
First, the settlement processes and aging of existing overseas com-
munities are likely to influence remittance behaviour. It is interesting 
to note that even some of the retired seamen who came to the U.K. 
many years ago, and refugees who arrived in the 1980s, are still send-
ing money, suggesting considerable persistence, often despite difficult 
circumstances. But the existing diaspora is rather stretched financially 
and its members perhaps unlikely to dig deeper into their pockets. 
Certain people claim that fatigue is setting in. While there is some 
evidence that the “1.5” and second generation are showing interest 
in Somalia and being encouraged to maintain connections, it seems 
highly unlikely that the remitting will be reproduced at the present 
high levels across generations. All in all, it seems likely that remit-
tances from the existing overseas population will gradually decline 
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rather than intensify in the future. What might offset this for a period 
would be an improvement of employment and income levels among 
people of Somali origin in the U.K.
Second, opportunities for new movement will affect both the sup-
ply and demand for assistance. While asylum opportunities in the 
Global North are narrowing, this may be offset somewhat by ever 
riskier forms of clandestine migration, by family reunion and marriage 
migration (although the latter can also reduce the candidates for assis-
tance in the home country), and by migration to the Middle East, if 
the demand for migrant workers there grows. Changing immigration 
regimes may affect the remittance economy. For example, under the 
new asylum system in the U.K., people given refugee status are subject 
to deportation after five years should circumstances in their country 
improve. This threat may encourage them to invest in relationships 
and assets back home or generate savings, in case of return.
Third, future political dispensations in the Somali regions will have 
critical implications for the supply and demand for assistance. Further 
war and instability would seem likely to lead to additional emigration 
and “survival remittances.” On the other hand, further stability in the 
northern regions may encourage remittances for investment projects 
and/or return of expatriates.
V. Beyond Economics: The Violent Origins and 
Social Texture of Remitting
This study of the Somali remittance process raises several issues that 
would be worth exploring in future studies. First, there is a far more 
unsettled relationship between the act of migration and the act of 
remitting than is commonly envisaged. People did not migrate in order 
to remit, as was envisaged in the dominant model of remittance behav-
iour. They primarily fled the Somali regions to escape life-threatening 
violence. Migration was not part of a careful plan to diversify their 
income (indeed, people have often lost important assets in the pro-
cess of flight) but a more fraught process focused on seeking a place 
of safety.49 Yet it seems that even when migration is not specifically 
undertaken in order to diversify household income sources, it may 
have that effect; remitting represents a post-hoc strategy or an “unfore-
seen burden.”50
The view from London also demonstrates that as migrants are not 
“just labour,” so remittances are not “just money” but an intense form 
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of “relational work.”51 They have become, in the Somali case, a major 
part of maintaining affectionate social relationships between people 
separated by war, distance, and great economic disparities. Under-
standing the control and transfer of remittances requires careful scru-
tiny of the social construction of the family and community in specific 
cultural and transnational contexts.
The accounts of Somali Londoners suggest that more attention 
should be paid to the issues of need and disparities in explaining remit-
tance practices. The North-South divide clearly infuses the everyday 
lives of Somali Londoners. People involved in this study repeatedly 
emphasised the large disparities between the West, where the bulk of 
remittances originate, and Africa, where the bulk of remittances arrive. 
Glaring and quantifiable, the material gulf between the host country 
and the country of origin has also become almost ritualised, inscribed 
in the collective consciousness of those involved. Remitters in the West 
can often afford to play a significant role in the livelihoods of recipi-
ents in a way that can continue over many years. Given the frequency 
of global migration along steep income gradients (as, for example, 
between Africa and Europe) as well as the segmentation of labour 
markets, which means that migrants often are restricted to poorly paid 
work, the issue of disparities (absolute and relative) in shaping the 
remittance process merits more attention.
The perspective from the diaspora makes it clear that at the same 
time as providing a means to reaffirm relationships with distant loved 
ones, remitting can also have substantial costs for migrants, a fact too 
often lost in the overwhelming focus of the literature on the impact 
of remittances in migrants’ countries of origin. In this sense, refugees’ 
experiences can offer a particularly clear antidote to transnational 
euphoria and offers a rather more troubled view of “globalisation from 
below.”52 As Doreen Massey puts it:
Most people actually still live in places like Harlesden or West Brom. 
Much of life for many people, even in the heart of the First World, still 
consists of waiting in a bus-shelter with your shopping for a bus that 
never comes. Hardly a graphic illustration of time-space compression.53
*This article is an edited version of a chapter of Dr. Lindley’s forthcom-
ing book, The Early Morning Phonecall: Somali Refugees’ Remittances, to 
be published by Berghahn Books in 2010. An earlier version is pub-
lished in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.
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Notes
1. Note that all names are pseudonyms and some details have been changed to preserve 
the anonymity of research participants.
2. GLA 2005.
3. Stark and Lucas 1988.
4. Aragno 2000.
5. Dahabshiil has a broad customer base in the U.K. and allowed the researcher to survey 
people sending remittances in one of its London offices. (For practical reasons, thirty 
questionnaires were administered in a second, smaller office.) 175 respondents were 
randomly sampled. The sample represents 17% of the customers at the outlet during 
the month in question. 19% of those initially approached refused to participate, mainly 
giving time pressure as a reason, but there was no evidence that this led to the under-
sampling of people with particular characteristics. Short face-to-face interviews were 
conducted by the researcher and an assistant, half in English and half in Somali.
6. Massey 1994, p. 61.
7. Lindley and Van Hear 2007.
8. This is the Labour Force Survey figure, according to Kevin Brennan’s (Parliamentary 
Secretary, Cabinet Office) written answer to a question by Michael Fallon, 20 April 2009. 
Accessed online on 8 May 2009 at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2009-
04-20c.269752. This seems a reasonable lower bound estimate when cross-checked with 
other sources:
a) 2001 Census recorded 43,373 people living in England and Wales who were 
born in Somalia
b) Labour Force Survey 1997 estimated a Somali-born population of 47,000 
(Griffiths 2002)
c) Home Office records show around 68,025 Somali nationals were granted settle-
ment in 1985–2007. It is thought that most will have remained in the U.K.
d) None of these sources adequately capture failed asylum-seekers and irregular 
migrants, and some would not capture Somali Europeans who have moved to the 
U.K., mainly since 2000 (Lindley and Van Hear 2007)
9. Griffiths et al. 2006.
10. GLA 2005.
11. Bloch and Atfield 2002.
12. Hansen 2006; Hammond 2008.
13. Al-Ali et al. 2001.
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14. As the money is transferred in U.S. dollars, respondents found it easier to remember 
how much they had sent in dollars. They usually say how much they want to send in 
U.S. dollars and then the cashier calculates the cost in pounds (of buying the dollars and 
paying commission of around 5%). Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest five. The 
$3,000 figure corroborates other estimates (Shire 2006; Lindley forthcoming).
15. This would appear to be relatively high levels of remittances. A large-scale survey 
of black and ethnic minority households in the U.K. found that more than one quarter 
had remitted money in the previous year, and the remitting households interviewed had 
sent an average of £874 (ICM 2006). A survey focusing specifically on low-paid migrant 
workers in London found that nearly three quarters had sent money home, an average of 
around £100 a month (Datta et al. 2007).
16. This broadly corroborates Shire 2006.
17. While the Census has limitations when it comes to reaching non-English speakers 
and inner city, transient, and economically marginalised populations, it remains the 
most comprehensive and robust source of data on the Somali-born population.
18. Sahlins 2004, pp. 186–87.
19. Cliggett 2005.
20. Bajic 2007.
21. The survey collected data on 177 people who received money from the respondents 
four or more times in the last year, mainly in the Somali regions.
22. Sahlins 2004.
23. Interview with Liban, London, November 2003.
24. Cliggett 2005; Santillán and Ulfe 2006.
25. Interview, money transfer agent, London, June 2002.
26. Interview with Abdirashid, London, May 2005.
27. Sahlins 2004, p. 211.
28. Al-Sharmani 2006; Hansen 2006.
29. See, for example, Al-Ali et al. 2001; Horst 2007; and Riak Akuei 2005.
30. It was deemed too sensitive to collect information on income in the survey.
31. Interview with Idil, London, May 2005.
32. Interview with Zahra, London, November 2004.
33. Interview with Idil, London, May 2005.
34. Income support at the time for a single person over 24 years old was £56.20 per week 
(£2,922.40 per year). Accessed online on 19 December 2006 at www.rightsnet.org.uk.
35. Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, p. 10.
36. Datta et al. 2007.
37. Ratha 2003.
38. Countries of birth compared were Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan.
39. Granovetter 1983.
40. Interview with Idil, London, May 2005.
41. See also Horst 2007; Riak Akuei 2005.
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42. Interview with Shamsa, London, May 2005.
43. Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, p. 15.
44. Interview with Farhiya, London, June 2006.
45. Informal consultation, money transfer agent, Hargeisa, November 2007.
46. United Nations 2007.
47. Brown and Poirine 2005.
48. Sana and Massey 2005.
49. While choice of destination was understandably influenced by family, economic, and 
status considerations, and as some regions stabilized, the economic rationale for migra-
tion became more salient, migration still remains a highly fraught process.
50. Riak Akuei 2005.
51. Zelizer 2005.
52. Black 2001.
53. Massey 1994, p. 163.
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